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TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (PEAK)







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
























TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (NORM)









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (NORM)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (AVG)





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C



































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































TV CAMERA GAMMA CMD SWITCH (WHITE STRCH)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NO COMPARIBLE NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL.
w


























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMP_ [ N /N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS".
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




























TV CAMERA GAMMA CMD SWITCH (BLACK STRCH)







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C
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TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [FLT DECK TVC SELECT] SW









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
C ] C ] C ]
C ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [FLT DECK TVC SELECT] SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [





























TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [MID DECK TVC SELECT] SW









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
C ] C ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ]






(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] [ ]














































TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [MID DECK TVC SELECT] SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





























TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC A FWD BAY SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.






































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8124
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC A SELECT] SW
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.

















TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC B KEEL/EVA SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
wOU£D_RESULT IN LOSS OF _C. _ UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.


































NASA [ / ]






TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC B SELECT] SW
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)








NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.





















TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC C AFT BAY SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 2 /1R ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] C P ] ['P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.

































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC C SELECT] SW
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
• (ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.















TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC D RMS STBD SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NQ_M_BLE NAS_A _CC_ _EA: FAiLURE_TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP_MD PRO_DES UNLi_ REDUNDANCY'

































TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC D SELECT] SW







NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]









[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[P] [p] [P] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
i















TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [RMS TVC SELECT] SW









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]- [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3/_R ]
(If different from NASA)
[p] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF THIS _U_CTION COUL_ RESULT


































TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [RMS TVC SELECT] SW









[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA.





LOSS OF THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT
r
w


























NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [P/L 1,2,OR 3 TVC SELECT] SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL.
[ ]
[ ]
























NASA [ / ] [ ] [
I0A [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [



































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
















































TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TEST SELECT] SWITCH
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
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TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [MUX SELECT] SWITCH




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [MON SELECT] SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PRO-VIDE MONITOR CAPABILITY COULD RESULT







































TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [MON SELECT] SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE MONITOR CAPABILITY COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW.
L














TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [P/L SELECT] SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [







































TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [P/L SELECT] SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [DOWNLINK SELECT] SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C














































TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [DOWNLINK SELECT] SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL.
[ ]
[ ]















TVC A PEAK ALC CONTROL SW





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







C ] [ ]
[ ] C ]








(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ]




































TVC A PEAK ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























TVC A NORM ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C !_
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] [ ] C ]
C ] C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































TVC A NORM ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [























TVC A AVG ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]







































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



























TVC B PEAK ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [






































TVC B PEAK ALC CONTROL SW





NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
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TVC B NORM ALC CONTROL SW









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]






(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] C ]










































TVC B NORM ALC CONTROL SW





NASA [ / ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ .
























TVC B AVG ALC CONTROL SW





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]















(If different from NASA)
i] [ ] [ ]- [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




































TVC B AVG ALC CONTROL SW





NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] E ] [


























TVC C PEAK ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



































TVC C PEAK ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]













(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
































TVC C NORM ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [













































TVC C NORM ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [


























TVC C AVG ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C


































TVC C AVG ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























TVC D PEAK ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
































TVC D PEAK ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





























TVC D NORM ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































TVC D NORM ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























TVC D AVG ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C











































TVC D AVG ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [



































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [


































RMS WRIST TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























RMS WRIST TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW (PEAK)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / ] c ] c ] [








































RMS WRIST TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C

























RMS WRIST TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [













































RMS WRIST TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





























RMS ELBOW TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW (PEAK)







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C" ] C ] [











































RMS ELBOW TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [































RMS ELBOW TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [




































RMS ELBOW TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























RMS ELBOW TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [



































RMS ELBOW TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] C ] C ] [


























FLT DECK TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW (PEAK)







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



































FLT DECK TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW





NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

























FLT DECK TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]














































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]

































FLT DECK TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































FLT DECK TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























MID FLT DECK TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW (PEAK)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [







































MID DECK TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C



























MID FLT DECK TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C













































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























MID FLT DECK TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [



































MID DECK TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























TVC A WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL.SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] E ] [










































TVC A WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH





NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [























COMM AND TRACK .......
8197
TVC A NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































TVC A .NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH





NASA [ / ]







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























TVC A BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] _ ] [





































TVC A BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C


























TVC B WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [









































TVC B WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]










(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























TVC B NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















































TVC B NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]






i RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





























TVC B BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [









































TVC B BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [



























TVC C WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [































TVC C WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






























COMM AND TRACK _
8209




NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































TVC C NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























TVC C BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [











































TVC C BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























TVC D WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )











































TVC D WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























TVC D NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















































TVC D NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]











[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] C ] [
C ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] ' [ ] [





























RMS WRIST TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] " C ] C ] [







































RMS WRIST TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [



























RMS WRIST TVC NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































RMS WRIST TVC NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



























RMS WRIST TVC BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C






































RMS WRIST TVC BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [



























RMS ELBOW TVC A WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [













































RMS ELBOW TVC A WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























RMS ELBOW TVC A NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C






















































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



























RMS ELBOW TVC A BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [










































RMS ELBOW TVC A BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























FLT DECK TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
















































FLT DECK TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] C ] C ] C
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [



























FLT DECK TVC NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































FLT DECK TVC NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [


























FLT DECK TVC BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ ] C ] C ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [



































FLT DECK TVC BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























MID DECK TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE .[ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [









































MID DECK TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























COMM AND TRACK _
8239
MID DECK TVC NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [






































MID DECK TVC NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































MID DECK TVC BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [


























TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD


























TVC A MONOCHROME LENS.ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]





(If different from NASA)
[P] [P] [P] i [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
w






















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B














(If different from NASA)
[P] [P] [P] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART_NASA_dcTV FMEA. FAILUi_E COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD






























TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
w















TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO CO_TERPARTNASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD





































TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[p] [P] [P] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
w
w















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























(If different from NASA)
[p] [P] [P] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO cOUNTERPART NASA-CCTV _A. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPAB_L_Y TO PERFORM THIS _CTIONCOULD













































TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD






















RMS WRIST TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM





































RMS WRIST TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

















RMS ELBOW TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM







































RMS ELBOW TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
w
















FLT DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































FLT DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























MID DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [







































MID DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL.
[ ]
[ ]












COMM AND TRACK _'_ _
8259
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]:
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD









































TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
IADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.















TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD


































TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD

















COMM AND TRACK _ _ _ _
8263
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C








(If different from NASA)
[P] [P] [p] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD






























TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.















TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P'] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD































TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

















RMS WRIST TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
C 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM

































RMS WRIST TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /ZR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
















RMS ELBOW TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM







































RMS ELBOW TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
w


















FLT DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZQOM CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )







































FLT DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




























MID DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [





















































MID DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
























TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]














[ 2 /1R ]
(If different from NASA)
i[P] [P] CP] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD



























TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.















TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD






























TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY LSCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
CP] [P] CP]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.














TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD


































TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
n RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.















TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD

































TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.














COMM AND TRACK _
8283
RMS WRIST TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM































RMS WRIST TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.



















RMS ELBOW TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
W. C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM




































RMS ELBOW TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

















FLT DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL





NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































FLT DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [

























MID DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [










































MID DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ ] [ ] [


























FLT DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C












































FLT DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




























FLT DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















































FLT DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C




























FLT DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































FLT DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL









NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
C I ]
(If different from NASA)
t
C ] C ] [ ]





























MID DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
C /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] C ]




































MID DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
r
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























MID DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































MID DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ J [





























COMM AND TRACK .......
8301




NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































MID DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD





























TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
w
-z

















TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[A]
(ADD/DELETE)
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD

































TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.















TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD

























TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.















TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD







































TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
m
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
w















TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD






























TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
CAD_DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
i

















TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD






































TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
















[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[P] [P] [P] [AJ
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
















TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]








[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[p] [P] [P] [ A.]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERP_T NASA CCTVFMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO P_RF0_ THIS _CTION COULD






























TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.















TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OE
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD






























TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B














[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
w















TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B




















(If different from NASA)
-[P] CP] [P] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD































TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.















COMM AND TRACK _ ...........
8321
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IDA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]_
COMPARE [ N /N ] N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MiSSI0_NT_ _SS_0F_ALL CAPABILITY TO_ERFO_THI_CTION COULD































TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
w















TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC . A B C




COMP_ [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NQICQUNTERP_TN_ASA_CC_ _A__FAiL_E COULD _$ULT_!N LOSS OF
MISSION. _S--S OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFO_ THiS _TION COULD
































TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD




















TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD



































TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
















RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]







[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
C P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM














































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM





















RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL






HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM








































RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
w
















RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL




HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM


































RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
L














COMM AND TRACK ......
8333
RMS ELBOW TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM








































RMS ELBOW TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)








NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM






















RMS ELBOW TVC COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM






































RMS ELBOW TVC COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
u














COMM AND TRACK _ _
8337
RMS ELBOW TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM

































RMS ELBOW TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM




















FLT DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
i
(If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































FLT DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [








































FLT DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C






















NASA [ / ]






FLT DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] E ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































FLT DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
















































MID DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C



































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

































MID DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
REMARKS: INADEQUATE






























MID DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PWR SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















































FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PWR SW





NASA [ / ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [

























MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PWR SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / J i c r





































MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PWR SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [


























FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PEAK SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEnU_TE_=
INADEQUATE
REMARKS-.








































FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PEAK SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [





































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PEAK SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






















SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8359
ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND
CONTRAST CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )





































SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8360
ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND
CONTRAST CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8362
ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND
CONTRAST CONTROL SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























CONSOLE MONITOR PWR SW





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C






COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF SECOND MONITOR COULD
PREVENT TV SCENE VIEWING AND TVC POINTING AND ADJUSTMENTS
CAPABILITY RESULTING IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND POSSIBLE LOSS




































CONSOLE MONITOR PWR SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF SECOND MONITOR COULD
PREVENT TV SCENE VIEWING AND TVC POINTING AND ADJUSTMENTS
CAPABILITY RESULTING IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND POSSIBLE LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
= =

















CONSOLE MONITOR X-HAIR SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























CONSOLE MONITOR X-HAIR SW







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
('ADD/DELETE )
























CONSOLE MONITOR SYNC SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






































CONSOLE MONITOR SYNC SW
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]







NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF SECOND MONITOR COULD
PREVENT TV SCENE VIEWING AND POINTING AND ADJUSTMENTS CAPABILITY
RESULTING IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW.
















CONSOLE MONITOR DATA SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































CONSOLE MONITOR DATA SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ J [ ] [


























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]













[ ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA [ / ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [














w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL.
[ ]
[ ]




















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































CONSOLE MONITOR SOURCE SW





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ J [ J *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
i
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF SECOND MONITOR COULD
PREVENT TV SCENE VIEWING AND POINTING AND ADJUSTMENTS CAPABILITY
RESULTING IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW.
















CONSOLE MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
































CONSOLE MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF SECOND MONITOR COULD
PREVENT TV SCENE VIEWING AND TVC POINTING AND ADJUSTMENTS
CAPABILITY RESULTING IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND POSSIBLE LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20203-I
NASA DATA:







RCU 3A CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB 37 & CB 42)




HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION WITH POTENTIAL
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20203-I
NASA DATA:







RCU 3A CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB 37 & CB 42)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20204-I
NASA DATA:







MON 3A CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB 38 & CB 43)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MONITORS NEEDED TO POINT AND ADJUST TVCS. SECOND FAILURE COULD


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20204-I
......NASA DATA: ........





COMM AND TRACI(/EPD&C _
8504
MON 3A CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB 38 & CB 43)





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]

















(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CB 39 FWD BAY TVC & P/T (3A)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]







[ 2 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[P] CP] CP] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL

































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 13 ]













[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILED CLOSED RETAINS USE OF TVC AND CRITICALITIES ARE IN
AGREEMENT.
B







NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:







CB 40 FWD BAY TVC HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ...............
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ONE FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL






























CB 40 FWD BAY TVC HTR (3A)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
























(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILED CLOSED RETAINS USE OF TVC CONSIDERING THERMOSTAT CONTROL
OF HTR. CRITICALITIES AGREE.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:







CB 41 FWD BAY P/T HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS-.
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:







CB 41 FWD BAY P/T HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILED CLOSED RETAINS USE OF TVC CONSIDERING THERMOSTAT CONTROL
OF HTR. CRITICALITIES AGREE.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20201-I
NASA DATA:







CB 34 AFT BAY TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
























CB 34 AFT BAY TVC & P/T (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ J *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILED CLOSED RETAINS USE OF TVC CONSIDERING THERMOSTAT CONTROL
OF HTR. CRITICALITIES AGREE.
l






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:







CB 35 AFT BAY TVC HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from:NASA)
[2 /1R ] [P] [P] [P] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:







CB 35 AFT BAY TVC HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILED CLOSED RETAINS USE OF TVC CONSIDERING THERMOSTAT CONTROL
OF HTR. CRITICALITIES AGREE.
r














CB 36 AFT BAY P/T HTR (3A)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fr0m_NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAIL_E C6ULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
























CB 36 AFT BAY P/T HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILED CLOSED RETAINS USE OF TVC CONSIDERING THERMOSTAT CONTROL
OF HTR. CRITICALITIES AGREE.
u
=






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20201-I
NASA DATA:







CB 45 KEEL/EVA TVC & P/T (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL _ i


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20201-I
NASA DATA:







CB 45 KEEL/EVA TVC & P/T (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
•(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILED CLOSED RETAINS USE OF TVC CONSIDERING THERMOSTAT CONTROL
OF HTR. CRITICALITIES AGREE.
=






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20201-I
NASA DATA:







CB 46 KEEL/EVA TVC HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OPENFAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:







CB 46 KEEL/EVA TVC HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
J
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILED CLOSED RETAINS USE OF TVC CONSIDERING THERMOSTAT CONTROL











NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:







CB 47 KEEL/EVA P/T HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:







CB 47 KEEL/EVA P/T HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILED CLOSED RETAINS USE OF TVC CONSIDERING THERMOSTAT CONTROL
OF HTR. CRITICALITIES AGREE.
m













CB 48 CABIN TVC (5A)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20201-I
NASA DATA:







CB 48 CABIN TVC (5A)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / ] t ] i ] .c ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























CB 51 STBD RMS TVC & P/T (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































CB 51 STBD RMS TVC & P/T (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ]. [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























CB 52 STBD RMS TVC HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]






COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























CB 52 STBD RMS TVC HTR (3A)





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL. STBD RMS NOT USED
ON PRESENT MISSIONS.















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































CB 53 STBD RMS P/T HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / J [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
{ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL. STBD RMS NOT USED
ON PRESENT MISSIONS.
w









NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20101-I
NASA DATA:







CB 55 PORT RMS TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OTHER TVCs AND CREW VIEWING COULD BE CONSIDERED AS UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY AND LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONS



























CB 55 PORT RMS TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE FAILED CLOSED NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL.
w..






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20102-I
NASA DATA:







CB 56 PORT RMS TVC HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
OTHER .............TVCs AND CREW VIEWING_COULD _ BE _C_NSIDERED AS U_LI_
REDUNDANCY AND LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONS







































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















NASA FMEA #: 06-6PK-20102-I
NASA DATA:







CB 57 PORT RMS P/T HTR (3A)










[2/2 ] [ ]
[2/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ] IX]*
[P] [P] IX]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
OTHER _Cs AND CREW VIEWING COULD BE CONSIDERED AS UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY AND LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONS






























CB 57 PORT RMS P/T HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ J [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE FAILED CLOSED NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL.


























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differen£ from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































HEADSET, VERY LIGHT WEIGHT




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] C P ] C P ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























COMM CARRIER ELECTRONICS MODULE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM IS USED POST-FLIGHT, POST-ABORT IN A SURVIVAL
SITUATION. NO NASA FMEA IN FMEA PACKET.
b















COMM AND TRACK '
9042





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS ITEM IS USED POST-FLIGHT, POST-ABORT IN A SURVIVAL






































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
• (ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS POSSIBILITY OF MULTIPLE HIU FAILURES, WITH
ULTIMATE EFFECT POSSIBLE LOSS OF VOICE CAPABILITY FOR STATE
VECTOR UPDATE, AFTER LOSS OF ALL HIU's AND BOTH S-BAND PM
STRINGS. EXTREME, BUT POSSIBLE SCENARIO.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2A-21926-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
- (ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS POSSIBILITY OF MULTIPLE HIU FAILURES, WITH
ULTIMATE EFFECT POSSIBLE LOSS OF VOICE CAPABILITY FOR STATE
VECTOR UPDATE, AFTER LOSS OF ALL HIU's AND BOTH S-BAND PM
























NASA FMEA #: 05-2A-21955-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
1
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]















C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [















































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE
14, "VTR OPERATIONS SHALL BE CONSIDERED CRITICALITIY 3/3."
=

















LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE































LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE



















VIDEO TAPE RECORDER PWR SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [






CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE






















VIDEO TAPE RECORDER PWR SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE
14, "VTR OPERATIONS SHALL BE CONSIDERED CRITICALITIY 3/3."
w


















VIDEO TAPE RECORDER AUDIO MODE SW
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _i
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH_NAsA B_KET sTATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE






































VIDEO TAPE RECORDER AUDIO MODE SW









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ / ]
(If different from NASA)
C ] [ ] C







CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE
14, "VTR OPERATIONS SHALL BE CONSIDERED CRITICALITIY 3/3."









BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 9068
ITEM: VIDEO TAPE RECORDER VIDEO MODE SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE



































VIDEO TAPE RECORDER VIDEO MODE SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASa [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ J [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE
14, "VTR OPERATIONS SHALL BE CONSIDERED CRITICALITIY 3/3."
w
















VIDEO TAPE RECORDER FUNCTION SELECT PUSH BUTTONS
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE





























VIDEO TAPE RECORDER FUNCTION SELECT PUSH BUTTONS
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
l




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE
14, "VTR OPERATIONS SHALL BE CONSIDERED CRITICALITIY 3/3."
w
i













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMTRK-9091
WCCS CREW REMOTE/AUDIO IF
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
9091
WIRELESS CREW COMM SYSTEM (WCCS)
A.W. ADDIS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE WCCS IS uSED iN LIEU OF HARDLINE CABLES BETWEEN CREW'MEMBER(S)
AND BU_EADAUDIDrJACKS. _ ON_SS_OF RFLINK(S)_,_THE CABLES




































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












[ ] C ]
C ] C ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [


















SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 9541
ITEM: BATTERY
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS BATTERY IS IN THE PRC 90-2 HAND-HELD SURVIVAL RADIO UNIT,
WHICH IS NOT USED EITHER IN FLIGHT OR ABORT, BU IN A POST-ABORT






























LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS BATTERY IS IN THE PRC 90-2 HAND-HELD SURVIVAL RADIO UNIT,
WHICH IS NOT USED EITHER IN FLIGHT OR ABORT, BU IN A POST-ABORT





















VTR CB 3 (5A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES AGRE_ WITH_BT_ANK]_T STAT_NT CCTV FMEA NOTE


































VTR CB 3 (5A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE
IR, "VTR OPERATIONS SHALL BE CONSIDERED CRITICALITY 3/3."
.p











VTR CB 1 (3A)
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEANOTE






























VTR CB 1 (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES AGREE WITH NASA BLANKET STATEMENT CCTV FMEA NOTE
IR, "VTR OPERATIONS SHALL BE CONSIDERED CRITICALITY 3/3."
w







NASA FMEA #: WCCS BATTERY
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 9591
ITEM: BATTERY




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LET E )





BATTERY PO_S_CST_SMITT_R. O. _SS OF WCCS T_SM_T











































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
m RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















COMM AND TRACK k __
10002
EMU/TV-LIGHT EMITTING DIODE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA FMEA. CREDIBLE FAILURE, BUT DOES NOTWARRANT






































LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA FMEA. CREDIBLE FAILURE THAT SHOULD BE ADDED
TO NASA FMEA's. CLOSE-UP EMU-TV VIEWS COULD BE VERY DESIREABLE











NASA FMEA #: EMU-TV-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
















































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








(If different from NASA)

















































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]































RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 7 ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )












NASA FMEA #: EMU-TV-4A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]







(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] [ ]




















































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA COMM & TRACK COUNTERPART. CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE THAT
SHOULD BE COVERED BY NASA POWER DIVISION.















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ _
II001




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
u
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24800-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GCIL DRIVER, S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT. THE AMPLIFIER DRIVERS ARE





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24800-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GCIL DRIVER, S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT. THE AMPLIFIER DRIVERS ARE
ENCOMPASSED IN THE NASA FMEA, WHICH COVERS ALL THE S-BAND PM
SYSTEM.















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
11005







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24800-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GCIL DRIVER, S-BAND PAYLOAD SYSTEM





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
CP] C P ]
CP] CP]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
11007





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA 11007 REFERS TO NSP ONLY, NASA FMEA COVERS ENTIRE S-BAND
SYSTEM, AND RELATES THE 3/IR CRITICALITY TO LOSS OF THE TWO S-
BAND PM STRINGS, LEAVING ONLY UHF VOIDE FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES.
A SINGLE FMEA CANNOT COVER ALL THE POTENTIAL DEGREES
OF CRITICALITY FOR THE S-BAND PM SYSTEM. LOSS OF FIRST NSP



































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
11008
GCIL DRIVER, KU-BAND SYSTEM
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIRECT COUNTERPART NASA FMEA. IOA 11008 CONSIDERED THE KU-
BAND PRIMARILY IN ITS ROLE AS A REDUNDANT PATH FOR THE ON-ORBIT
COMM FUNCTION. LOSS OF KU-BAND COMM AND ALL OTHER PATHS FOR COMM
(S-BAND PM STRING 1 AND STRING 2 PLUS UHF VOICE) COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE (INABILITY TO UPDATE STATE VECTOR
BEFORE DE-ORBIT BURN).








NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24800-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK .....
11009
GCIL DRIVER, KU-BAND SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .......
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )







































GCIL DRIVER, CCTV SYSTEM




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA ASSIGNS CRITICALITY 2/IR ON PREMISE THAT CCTV IS
REQUIRED FOR RMS STOW OPERATIONS AND TO ENSURE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24801-I
NASA DATA:
BASELI_[ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23510-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, QUAD ANTENNA ROTARY SELECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ i C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) : _
....... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23510-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, QUAD ANTENNA ROTARY SELECTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )






























NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
21073




NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21804-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, NSP ENCRYPTION POWER ON-OFF







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
t
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]




[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
i
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23528-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, QUAD/HEMI ANTENNA ELECTRONICS POWER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] C ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:






























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-212841-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT CIRCUIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NOT COVERED IN IOA.
[x]
[ ]







NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-22801-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, QUAD ANTENNA POSITION INDICATOR









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23521-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT, SWITCH SCAN, FM SYSTEM







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:










NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24830-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, S-BAND PAYLOAD PNL/CMD GCIL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24830-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, S-BAND PAYLOAD PNL/CMD GCIL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :



















NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]




NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
24062
K'U BD EA-I (INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C ......_ ...
] [ ] [ ] [x]*
] [ ] [ ] [x]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
W.C. LONG
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

















































NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
24063




NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)





NASA [ 2 /2 ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [








[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY) THERMOSTATS





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
RE_KS
L0 sOF:MEASUR HTDOESNOTHINDER  S EeOHD
FAILURE, THE THERMOSTAT, COULD ALLOW FOR OVERHEATING OR FREEZING
RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO GIMBAL THUS JEOPARDIZING THE SECURING OF



























NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22101-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, UHF MODE ROTARY SELECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NOT COVERED BY IOA. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: FMEA ASSIGNS





















NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
25016
SWITCH, UHF MODE ROTARY SELECTOR
A.W. ADDIS
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE C /N ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
[ x ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NOT CO_RED BY IOA. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: FMEA AssIGNS






























NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22101-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, UHF MODE ROTARY SELECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NOT COVERED BY IOA. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: FMEA ASSIGNS
CRITICALITY 3/2R FOR EVA OPS, 2/IR FOR PHASES WHERE STATE VECTOR
UPDATES ARE REQUIRED.







NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22101-5 i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, UHF MODE ROTARY SELECTOR












NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NOT COVERED IN IOA, FOR ON-ORBIT EVA OPS INABILITY TO SELECT UHF
MODE COULD CAUSE_SSION LOSS (2/2) FOR DE-ORBIT/LANDING LOSS
OF ALL PATHS FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE (S-BAND PM AND UHF VOICE)


























NASA FMEA #: 05-2A-21948-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, UHF AIR-TO-AIR (AUDIO CENTER)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-2A-21948-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, UHF AIR-TO-AIR (AUDIO CENTER)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NASA FMEA #: 05-2A-21948-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, UHF AIR-TO-AIR (AUDIO CENTER)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 05-2A-21949-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, UHF AIR-TO-AIR (AUDIO CENTER)






HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS. •




































NASA FMEA #: 05-2A-21949-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, UHF AIR-TO-AIR (AUDIO CENTER)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
25024








NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C





















































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS".
NOT COVERED IN IOA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]


















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
05-2A-21907-3







] [ ] [
] [ ] [
] [ ] [
NASA_TA: ......
BASELINE [ ]





(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]








































NASA FMEA #: 05-2A-21914-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NOT COVERED IN IOA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-2A-21914-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 27055
ITEM: TACAN ID SWITCH









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
t
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NOT COVERED IN IOA.
(if applicable)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-2C-22200-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 27056
ITEM: TACAN




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/l ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING NEAR IN OPERATION S-BAND OR UHF VOICE LINK SHOULD PROVIDE
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY, BUT UNDER WORST CASE CONDITIONS
IMMEDIATELY AFTER BLACKOUT STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY MAY BE
LOSS.
















NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOa [ I /i ]
















[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [










































NASA FMEA #: 05-2C-23000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]













(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [p]







NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM






(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-2F-22601-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MSBLS RF WAVEGUIDE ASSEMBLY





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.
ix]
[ ]
















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
27O61
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA FMEA #: 05-2F-23100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[x]
[ ]







NASA FMEA #: 05-6PD-22701-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDAC ID: 27063
ITEM: RA PWR SWITCH




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ....
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[3/3 3 C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ ......
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PF-22401-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PD-22703-I
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]






RADAR ALTIMETER, RESISTOR R1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [








































NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT LIMIT SWITCH





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]







NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR
























NASA FMEA #: 4.4.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT LIMIT SWITCH





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK ..........
28380




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS. -
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING _S MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND




























NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





























NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
28382




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






































NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m







NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR
































NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]















NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK :
28386
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH








NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]




[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
[P] [P] [P]






INADEQUATE [ X ]
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE ....
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND





























NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]






w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]






NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.4
NASA DATA:_i
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
RMS _TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONIT_RING _S MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH C_SURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND




















NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] [ ]






















NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK _
28390
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
CP] [P] CP]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ x ] *
ix]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _? _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS : _ z
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR























NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
AGREE.
] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If appiicablei ..... _=_
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



































NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )















NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND


























NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fro_ NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]







NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
_S _C DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY _CTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND























NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [







































NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]











(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ ]






ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]












NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
28400
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
v




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _7\L_I_
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR




























NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]





(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
































NASA FMEA #: 5.2.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH








[ 3 13 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








(If rdifferent from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [ ]














NASA FMEA #: 5.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMM AND TRACK ....
28404
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ _




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOS_E. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND














































































































































SWITCH BEAM CONTROL E
SWITCH BEAM CONTROL E










NSP ENCRYPTION MODE S




NSP UPLINK DATA SOURC
NSP DATA RATE XMIT SW
NSP DATA RATE RCV SWI
NSP CODING XMIT SWITC













PAYLOAD RF TRANSFER S
PAYLOAD RF TRANSFER S
S-BAND PAYLOAD SYSTEM
S-BAND PL PI/PSP POWE
S-BAND PL ANTENNA POL
PI TRANSMITTER RF PWR
PL SYSTEM XMTR MODULA
S-BAND FREQUENCY SWEE
S-BAND PL PSP COMMAND
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETUR
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETUR
KU BD ANT A PYRO ARM/














FAILS TO REMAIN O
FAILS TO REMAIN O
SHORTED































































































































































KU BD ANT A PYRO ARM/
KU BD ANT A PYRO JETT
















UHF SIMPLEX PA PWR SW
UHF SIMPLEX POWER SWI
UHF SIMPLEX POWER SWI
UHF XMIT FREQUENCY SE




















RR EA-I (INTERFACE AN
RR EA-I (INTERFACE AN
RR EA-2 (RADAR SIGNAL
RR DEA (DEPLOYED ELEC
RR DEA (DEPLOYED ELEC
RR DEA (DEPLOYED ELEC





















FAILS TO REMAIN O
FAILS TO REMAIN O
SHORTED
FAILS TO REMAIN O
SHORTED
FAILS TO REMAIN O
FAILS TO REMAIN 0
FALLS TO REMAIN O
INTERMITTENT AND




FAILS OUT OF TOLE








FALLS OUT OF TOLE












































































RR DMA (DEPLOYED MECH
RR DMA (DEPLOYED MECH




KU A MODE SWITCH (REF
KU A MODE SWITCH (REF




SLEW ELEV CONTROL SWI
SLEW ELEV CONTROL SWI
SLEW RATE CONTROL SWI
























































































































































































































































TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD


















































































































TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
TV CAME_ O (RIMS STBD
8011 TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
8011 TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
8011 TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD
8011 TV CAME_ D (RM$ STBD
8012 TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
8012 TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
8012 TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
8012 TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
8012 TV CAMk-_A EMS WRIST
8012 TV CAMERA RMS WRIST































TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
TV CAMERA _S WRIST
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
TV CAMERA RMS ELBO_
TV C_MERA RMS ELBOW
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
TV CA_A RMS ELBOW
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PA_ AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
P_N AND TILT UNIT {TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV























































































































































































PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
















































FAILS TO START ST
FAILS TO START ST
FAILS TO START ST












































































































PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN-AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
O-8
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO START ST
FAILS TO START ST
FAILS TO START ST
FAILS TO START ST







































































































































































PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RM

















.WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE 5ENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (














































































































































































COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR L_ENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
COLOR __ENs ASSEMBLY (
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (
TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWIT
TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWIT
TV SYNC SWITCH
TV CAMERA POWER SWITC
TV CAMERA POWER SWITC
TV CAMERA_ POWER SWITC
TV CAMERA POWER SWITC
TV CAMERA POWER SWITC
TV CAMERA POWER SWITC
TV CAMERA POWER SWITC
TV CAMERA POWER SWITC
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
=, :
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT
TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS S
TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS S
TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SW
TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SW
TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SW
TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SW
TV CAMERA CMD TILT SW



































































































































TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWI
TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWI
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [T
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [T
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [T
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [T
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [T
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [T
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [T
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [T
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY

































































































































TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC D COLOR LENS A$SY
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC D CO_LOR LENS_KSSY
CONSOLE MONITOR PWR S




CB 39 FWD BAY TVC & P
CB 40 FWD BAY TVC HTR
CB 41FWD BAY P/T HTR
CB 34 AFT BAY TVC & P
CB 3_ _T BAY TVC HTR
CB 36 AFT BAY P/T HTR
CB 45 KEEL/EVA TVC &
CB 46 KEEL/EVA TVC HT
CB 47 KEEL/_VA P/T HT
CB 52 STBD RMS TVC HT
CB 53 STBD RMS P/T HT
CB 5_5_PORT RMS TVC &
CB 56 PORT RMS TVC HT





GCIL DRIVER, CCTV SYS
SWITCH, QUAD ANTENNA
DIODE, NSP ENCRYPTION
KU BD EA-I (INTERFACE
RR EA-2 (RADAR SIGNAL
KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED E
KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED E










SWITCH, UHF MODE ROTA
SWITCH, UHF MODE ROTA














































LOSS OF TX INHIBI
LOSS OF CONTROL O
FAILS TO REMAIN O
SHORTED
SHORTED










































PAN AND TILT UNIT LIM
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEM
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEM










































This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA87001-
09, Analysis of the Communication and Tracking Subsytem (31
December 1987). Prior results were obtained independently and
documented before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity.
Supplemental analysis was performed to address failure modes not
previously considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the
hardware item being analyzed, parent assembly and function
performed. For each failure mode possible causes are identified,
and hardware and functional criticality for each mission phase
are determined as described in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA and CIL, _00Gtober 1986. Failure mode
effects are described at the bottom of each sheet and worst case
criticality is identified at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen



















SWITCH, QUAD _TE_A ROT_Y SELECTOR
OPEN (ET._CTRICAL)














_TCH, QUAD _TE_A SET,_TOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
RED_D_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
_CATION: P_EL C3
P_T _BER: ME452-0093-5042
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-P_T FAILURE
c[P]
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
THE SWITCH PEWITS AuTO,TIC (GPC) OR _AL SE_CTION FROM THE
FOUR DUAL-BE_ QUAD _TENNAS. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT
OPTIMUM _TENNA COULD REQUI_ VEHICT._. ATTITUDE T_T WOULD RESULT
IN _SS OF PRIME MISSION O_ECTIVES.
REFERENCES: SC_MATIC VS70-740259



























































SWITCH, QUAD ANTENNA ROTARY SELECTOR
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, SHORTED













SWITCH, QUAD ANTENNA SELECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0093-5042
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SWITCH PERMITS AUTOMATIC (GPC) OR MANUAL SELECTION FROM THE
FOUR DUAL-BEAM QUAD ANTENNAS. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT
OPTIMUM ANTENNA COULD REQUIRE VEHICLE ATTITUDE THAT WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF PRIME MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740259
E
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH, QUAD ANTENNA ROTARY SELECTOR
SHORTED













SWITCH, QUAD ANTENNA SELECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: -
THE SWITCH PERMITS AUTOMATIC (GPC) OR MANUAL SELECTION FROM THE
FOUR DUAL-BEAM QUAD ANTENNAS. SHORT TO GROUND COULD CAUSE LOSS










































SWITCH, NSP ENCRYPTION POWER ON-OFF
SHORTED

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BRIDING CONTACT SHORT COULD PREVENT POWER REMOVAL FROM COMSEC LRU
AND CAUSE LOSS OF ONE METHOD OF ZEROIZING ENCRYPTOR.
REFERENCES".
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-5
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH, QUAD/HEMI ANTENNA ELECTRONICS POWER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: coNT_INATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_TIkO_ ......................... _;_;
THE SWITCH CONTROLS POWER TO ONE OF THE TWO REDUNDANT ANTENNA
CONTROL ELECTRONICS SETS IN GCIL PANEL OR COMMAND MODE. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL QUAD ANTENNA SELECTION COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION OBJECTIVES, BUT_V_C_ ATTI_DE COULD BE















































SWITCH, QUAD/HEMI ANTENNA ELECTRONICS POWER
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SWITCH CONTROLS POWER TO ONE OF THE TWO REDUNDANT ANTENNA
CONTROL ELECTRONICS SETS IN GCIL PANEL OR COMMAND MODE. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL QUAD ANTENNA SELECTION COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION OBJECTIVES, BUT VEHICLE ATTITUDE COULD BE
REFERENCES: VS70-740259, VS70-740299
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




2/10/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC





RELAY ASSEMBLY, PM TRANSPONDER SIGNAL STRENGTH
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
















FLIGHT_PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT _DW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/iR
DEORBIT : 3/3 ATO : 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
PROVIDES CAPABILITY TO SELECT TRANSPONDER FOR RF RECEIVED SIGNAL
STRENGTH. SHORT TO GROUND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF AFFECTED
TRANSPONDER_ WITH LOSS OF RED UND_T T_SPONDER_Y RE_INiNG
PATH FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE IS _F VOICE. LOSS OF THAT PATH











































DIODE, NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT CIRCUIT
SHORTED














ENCRYPTION SELECT ISOLATION DIODES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODES STEER MODE CONTROL SIGNALS TO NSP FOR "RECORD CLEAR" AND
"RECORD ENCRYPTED" FUNCTIONS. FAILURE OF CR2, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD
PERMIT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO BE RECORDED CLEAR AND THEN
TRANSMITTED. SUCH FAILURE COULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RESISTOR, QUADANTENNA POSITION INDICATOR
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)














RESISTOR, ANTENNA POSITION INDICATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: ' 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: .3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FOUR RESIST0#S ARE US_pTO LIMIT CURRENT I N THE ANTENNA
SELECTION INDICATION CIRCUIT. LOSS OF FUNCTION WOULD NOT AFFECT










































CIRCUIT, SWITCH SCAN, FM SYSTEM
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND FM SYSTEM
3) RF COMM
4) S-BAND FM RF SWITCH














3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO : 3/3 '
3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CIRCUIT PROVIDES TELEMETRY RF SWITCH SCAN INDICATION FOR S-BAND
FM SYSTEM. CIRCUITRY INCLUDES ANTENNA SELECT SWITCH, FOUR
RESISTORS, FOUR DIODES. LOSS OF CIRCUITRY FUNCTION WOULD NOT
AFFECT MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SHEMATIC VS70-740259
w
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-II
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH, S-BAND PAYLOAD PNL/CMD GCIL
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: MC452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ i _ _ _ _ i
THE PNL/CMD GCIL SWITCH PERMITS PANEL CONTROL OF THE PAYLOAD COMM
SYSTEM IN PNL MODE AND CONTROL VIA GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD IN
CMD MODE. WORST-CASE SHORT TO GROUND COULD OPEN BOTH MNA, MNC
CIRCUIT BREAKERS, KILLING COMMAND MODE FOR ALL FIVE
GCIL COMM SYSTEMS, INCLUDING S-BAND PM. LOSS OF ALL PATHS FOR
UPDATING STATE VECTOR, INCLUDING S-BAND PM IN PNL MODE AND UHF

















REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, 16.15, 16.17, INCO/COMM SYS
























SWITCH, S-BAND PAYLOAD PNL/CMD GCIL
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: MC452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PNL/CMD SWITCH PERMITS PANEL CONTROL OF THE PAYLOAD COMM
SYSTEM IN PNL MODE AND CONTROL VIA GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD IN
CMD MODE. CONTACT-TO-CONTACT SHORTS COULD CAUSE _SS OF PANEL
MODE CONTROL. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF GCIL HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL THE SYSTEM, AND COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, 16.15, 16.17, INCO/COMM SYS
BRIEF 31, 34, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii, OMRSD V74 FILE
III
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















BD EA-I (INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT)
FAILS TO INHIBIT TRANSMITTER mILE ANT IN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/F_C
P_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A
PART _BER: EA-I MC403-0025-I001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-P_T
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
CO_ SECT OF _-BD CO_/RDR SYS OPE_TES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PR0_ A TDRSS_INKI___=GND _D ORB, THE C0MM SECT
PROVIDES-ORB-UP_D-bO_LINK=_TA; UP_VO/C_S _D DN
VO/T_/_/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE _DUND
COULD IN _E WOI_ST-_SE RESULT Iq_-L_E_ OF _ICLE AND C_.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXITST VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) _SS_QE sv UPDATES PRESENTS WORS_CASE
CONDITION. FAILURE TO INHIBIT TX COULD CONTAMINATE P/L
EXPERIMENT AND RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. HIGH REFLECTED POEWR
WILL INITIATE TWT DISABLE WHILE IN THIS CONDITION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/HSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18






































2/13/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC




RR EA-2 (RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR)
FAILS TO COMMAND DA TO SELECT RF POWER SETTING















EA-2 RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: _ 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF HTE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OR RANGE, RANGE RATE,
ANGLE AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) LOSS OF RR POWER LEVEL CONTROL
COULD REDUCE OPERATIONS RANGE BELOW NEEDED CAPABILITY TO
CAPTURE/TRACK DETACHED PAYLOAD OR SATELLITE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/HSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/13/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 24064 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF TX INHIBIT, FAILS TO INHIBIT TX WHILE ANT
IN OBSCURATION ZONE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) KU COMM

























CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CON_IG
TO PROVIDE A-T_S$ LINK BETWEEN THE G_D_D 6RB_ THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK OATA;_UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW_
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) LOSS OF SV UPDATE PRESENTS WORST CASE o_
CONDITION. DEA PROVIDES RCVR/EXCITER ELECTRONICS FOR
TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION OF KU BD SIGNALS. FAILURE TO INHIBIT
TX COULD CONTAMINATE P.L RESULTING IN POTENTIAL LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/HSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18






























2/13/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC




KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY) THERMOSTATS
LOSS OF CONTROL OF HEATER ELEMENTS
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS') LOSS OF _ UPDATES PRESENTS WORST CASE
CONDITION. DMA PROVIDES ANTENNA AND GIMBAL MOTORS OF POINTING
ANT. EXCESSIVE TEMPERATURE COULD DAMAGE GIMBALS PREVENTING
ADEQUATE ANTENNA CONTROL. FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
AND LOSS OF ALL CAP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF STOW CAP.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/HSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-17
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




2/13/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC





KU BD DMA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY) TEMPERATURE
LOss oF TEMPERATUREMEASUREMENT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: DDMA
PART NUMBER: MC405-0025-300X
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG TO
PROVIDE A TDRSS LINKBETWEENTHE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALLMEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WQRST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) LOSS OF SV UPDATES PRESENTS WORST CASE
CONDITION. FAI£_-OF/SENSOR HAS N0--EF?ECT ON HEATER BUT
PREVENTS GND MONITORING OF TEMP AND FLT DIRECTOR COULD CURTAIL
MISSION. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY THERMOSTAT AND MANUAL ON/OFF CONTROL.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/HSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18

































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/01/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 25015 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, UHF MODE ROTARY SELECTOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)













SWITCH, ROTARY MODE SELECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO SELECT EVA MODE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES DURING FLIGHT PHASE. WITH LOSS OF BOTH NSP's BECAUSE
OF POSSIBLE KU-BAND SIGNAL PROCESSOR FAILURE DISABLING BOTH
NSP's UHF VOICE IS ONLY PATH FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES. LOSS OF
UHF FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9

















SWITCH, UHF MODE ROT_Y SE_CTOR
SHORTED













SWITCH, ROT_Y MODE SET_CTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
P_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBiT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
_CATION: P_EL 06
P_T _BER: ME452-0093-5027
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-P_T FAILURE, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
A SHORT FROM "QUID T/R" CONTACT TO THE WIPER C0_ON COULD
P_VENT USE OF BOTH 259.7 _2 _D 296.8 _2 T_SCEI_RS FOR EVA
OR CO_ WITH GRO_D. SYSTEM WOULD BE USEAB_ ONLY ON QUiD
F_QuENCY (243 _2), LOSS OF _VA_Q_ COULD C_USE _$S OF MISSION
O_ECTIVES' WI_ _SS OF POWER TO BOTH _NSP's _ TO_POSSIB_ _-
B_D SIGNAL PROCESSOR FAIL_, ONLY _F VOICE WOULD RE_IN FOR
STATE _CTOR UPDATES. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO UPDATE STATE























_FE_NCES: SCHE_TIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9 i
II
lm





















SWITCH, UHF MODE ROTARY SELECTOR
SHORTED













SWITCH, ROTARY MODE SELECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORT FROM "EVA" CONTACT TO WIPER COMMON WITH SWITCH IN
"SIMPLEX" OR FROM "SIMPLEX" CONTACT TO WIPER COMMON WITH SWITCH
IN "EVA" CAUSES LOSS OF RECEIVER SIGNAL ON 296.8 MH2 OR 259.7
MH2, RESPECTIVELY, BECAUSE THE TRANSMITTER ON THE AFFECTED
FREQUENCY WILL BE HELD ON. WITH ONLY ONE EVC TRANSMIT/ORBITER
RECEIVE CHANNEL AVAILABLE, AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE AFFECTING THAT
LINK WOULD CAUSE EVA TERMINATION AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
WITH "EVA" MODE ACTIVATED, PA WOULD BE BY-PASSED, LIMITING UHF
RANGE. WITH LOSS OF POWER TO BOTH NSP's DUE TO POSSIBLE KU-BAND
SIGNAL PROCESSOR FAILURE, ONLY UHF VOICE WOULD REMAIN FOR STATE
VECTOR UPDATES. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO UPDATE STATE VECOTR
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-7401i9, SSSH 16.9
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/02/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 25018 ABORT: 8/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, UHF MODE ROTARY SELECTOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)













SWITCH, ROTARY MODE SELECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB!T: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:_
A SHORT FROM "EVA" CONTACT TO WIPER COMMON WITH SWITCH IN
"SIMPLEX" OR FROM "SIMPLEX" CONTACT TO WIPER COMMON WITH SWITCH
IN "EVA" CAUSES LOSS OF RECEIVER SIGNAL ON 296.8 MH2 OR 259.7
FREQUENCY WILL BE HELD ON. WITH ONLY ONE EVC TRANSMIT/ORBITER
RECEIVE CHANNEL AVAILABLE, AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE AFFECTING THAT
LINK WOULD CAUSE EVA TERMINATION AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
WITH "EVA" MODE ACTIVATED, PA WOULD BE BY-PASSED, LIMITING UHF
RANGE. WITH LOSS OF POWER TO BOTH NSP's DUE TO POSSIBLE KU-BAND
SIGNAL PROCESSOR FAILURE, ONLY UHF VOICE WOULD REMAIN FOR STATE
VECTOR UPDATES. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO UPDATE STATE VECOTR
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.














































SWITCH, UHF AIR-TO-AIR (AUDIO CENTER)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH PERMITS USE OF AUDIO SYSTEM A/A LOOP WITH THE UHF
TRANSCEIVER FOR TWO-WAY VOICE COMM ORBITER-TO-GROUND OR ORBITER-
TO-EVA CREWMEMBER. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO USE THE UHF FOR EVA
OPS (VIA A/A, A/G1, OR A/G2 LOOP) COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO USE S-BAND PM (A/G1, A/G2 LOOPS) AND
UHF (ALL LOOPS) WITH GROUND WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF STATE VECTOR
UPDATE AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740249
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT















SWITCH, _F AIR-TO-AIR (AUDIO CENTER)
SHORTED _ _ .........
_AD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:










FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_TIQNA_:
SWITCH PEEMITS USE OF AUDIO SYSTEM AIA _OP WITH _E UHF
T_SCEI_R FOR _O-WAY VOICE CO_ ORBITER-TO-GROUND OR ORBITER-
TO-EVA CREWMEMBER. _SS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO USE THE UHF FOR EVA
OPS (VIA A/A, A/G1, OR A/G2 _OP) _LD CAUSE MISSION _SS, ,!::±i:_
_SS 0F-ALL CAPABI_ _'TO OSE _ S-B_M'(A/G_ _A/G2 LOOPS) AND
UHF (ALL LOOPS) WITH GROUND WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF STATE VECTOR
UPDATE AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. NOTE: LOSS OF
BOTH NSP's BECAUSE OF A SINGLE FAILURE (DIODE SHORT IN KU-BAND
SIGNAL PROCESSOR) PLUS A SHORT IN THIS SWITCH THAT DISABLES THE
UHF TRANSCEIVER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO UPDATE STATE







































SWITCH, UHF AIR-TO-AIR (AUDIO CENTER)
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH PERMITS USE OF AUDIO SYSTEM A/A LOOP WITH THE UHF
TRANSCEIVER FOR TWO-WAY VOICE COMM ORBITER-TO-GROUND OR ORBITER-
TO-EVA CREWMEMBER. CONTINUOUS RF OUTPUT CAUSED BY SWITCH JAMMED
IN "ON" POSITION WOULD NOT CAUSE MISSION LOSS OR THREATEN
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740249

















SWITCH, UHF AIR-TO-AIR (AUDIO CENTER)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF SYSTEM
3) AUDIO CENTER







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3_:{
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH PERMITS USE OF AUDIO SYSTEM A/ql_ A/G2 LOOPS WITH THE UHF
TRANSCEIVER FOR TWO-WAY VOICE COMM ORBITER-TO-GROUND OR ORBITER-
TO-EVA CREWMEMBER. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO USE THE UHF FOR EVA
OPS (VIA A/A, A/G1, OR A/G2 LOOP) COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO USE S-BAND PM (A/G1, A/G2 LOOPS) AND UHF
(ALL LOOPS) WITH GROUND WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF STATE VECTOR UPDATE










































ITEM: SWITCH, UHF AIR-TO-AIR (AUDIO CENTER)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF SYSTEM
3) AUDIO CENTER







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH PERMITS USE OF AUDIO SYSTEM A/G1, A/G2 LOOPS WITH THE UHF
TRANSCEIVER FOR TWO-WAY VOICE COMM ORBITER-TO-GROUI_D OR ORBITER-
TO-EVA CREWMEMBER. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO USE THE UHF FOR EVA
OPS (VIA A/A, A/G1, OR A/G2 LOOP) COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO USE S-BAND PM (A/G1, A/G2 LOOPS) AND UHF
(ALL LOOPS) WITH GROUND WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF STATE VECTOR UPDATE
AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. NOTE: LOSS OF BOTH
NSP's BECAUSE OF A SINGLE FAILURE (DIODE SHORT IN
KU-BAND SIGNAL PROCESSOR) PLUS A SHORT IN THIS SWITCH THAT
DISABLES THE UHF TRANSCEIVER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO
UPDATE STATE VECTOR AND RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740249
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH, UHF AIR-TO-AIR (AUDIO CENTER)
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF SYSTEM
3 ) AUDIO CENTER







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-P_T FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH PERMITS USE OF AUDIO SYSTEM A/G1, A/G2 LOOPS WITH THE UHF
TRANSCEIVER FOR TWO-WAY VOICE COMM ORBITER-TO-GROUND OR ORBITER-
TO-EVA CREWMEMBER. CONTINUOUS RF OUTPUT CAUSED BY SWITCH JAMMED








































LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAI DS
3 ) TACAN







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDENG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A5 AND A9 S12, S13
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7106, ME4352-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE
AND BEARING INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN
TO 1500 FEET ALT OR 15 NM FROM LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO DETERMINING RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE
REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER TACAN UNITS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR
DETERMINING RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND
STARTING 15 NM FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS.) TACAN ID TONE NOT
NECESSARY FOR TACAN OPERATION. STATION DETERMINED BY KNOWN
APPROXIMITY LOCATION AND CHANNEL NUMBER.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION i.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-29
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) TACAN























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: PANEL A5 AND A9 S12, S13
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7106, ME4352-0102-7101
CONTAMINATION,=PIECE PART FAILURECAUSES".
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: __ _ _ _
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TAdAN_u_I_;'_THR_NGLE _ST_ING_'_NCLUDING _
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE
AND BEARING INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN
TO_ f_0_6_ET_ALT_OR'_15 __dM __G." .....LOSS OF ALL' CAPABILITY
TO D_NING RANGE_PLU_BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE
REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER TACAN UNITS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR
DETERMINING RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND
STARTING 15 NM FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS.) TACAN ID TONE NOT
NECESSARY FOR TACAN OPERATION. STATION DETERMINED BY KNOWN
APPROXIMITY LOCATION AND CHANNEL NUMBER.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS















































LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3 ) TACAN







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A5 AND A9 S12, S13
ME452-0102-7106, ME4352-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE
AND BEARING INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN
TO 1500 FEET ALT OR 15 NM FROM LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO DETERMINING RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE
REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER TACAN UNITS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR
DETERMINING RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND
STARTING 15 NM FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS.) TACAN ID TONE NOT
NECESSARY FOR TACAN OPERATION. STATION DETERMINED BY KNOWN
APPROXIMITY LOCATION AND CHANNEL NUMBER.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE Ill, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION I.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) TACAN


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A5 AND A9 S12, S13
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7106, ME4352-0102-7101
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RA__TIONALE; ............... _............................... _i_=&_=:_,
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, I_NTHRE_S!NGLE STRINGS INCLUDING _
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE
AND BEARING INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN
TO 1500 FEET ALT OR 15 NM FROM LANDING. _SS OF ADL CAPABILITY
TO DETERMINING RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE
REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER TACAN UNITS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR
DETERMINING RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND
STARTING 15 NM FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS,) TACAN ID TONE NOT
NECESSARY FOR TACAN OPERATION. STATION DETERMINED BY KNOWN
APPROXIMITY LOCATION AND CHANNEL NUMBER.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS















































FAILURE MODE: BLANKING PULSE FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 1 UNIT BAY i, 1 UNIT BAY 2, 1 UNIT BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC409-0014-0006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS,
OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE AND BEARING
INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN TO 1500
FEET ALT OR 15 NM FROM LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR
DETERMINING RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE
REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER TACAN UNITS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR
DETERMINING RANGE AND BEARING EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND
STARTING 15 NM FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS.) FAILURE OF BLANKING
PULSE TO TURN OFF WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TACAN FUNCTION FOR ALL
THREE UNITS. BLANKING PULSE DISABLES ALL TACAN RECEIVERS.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION i.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















BLANKING PULSE FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 1 UNIT BAY i, 1 UNIT BAY 2, 1 UNIT BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC409-0014-0006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE= ....
THE TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACANUNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS,
OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE AND BEARING
INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 16O,OQg_FEE _ AL_ DOWN TO 1500
FEET ALT OR 15 NM FROM LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR
DETERMINING RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY............ COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND C REW_ ..... (LIKE
REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER TACAN _, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR
DETERMINING RANGE AND BEARING EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND
STARTING 15 NM FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS.) FAILURE OF BLANKING
PULSE TO TURN ON WOULD REDUCE SENSITIVITY OF TACAN RECEIVERS
REDUCING RANGE SO THAT STATE VECTOR UPDATES MAY NOT BE OBTAINED
IMMEDIATELY AFTER BLACKOUT.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM_SHE_TIC-VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION i.













































FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
. LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ i ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER AND LOWER FUSELAGE
MC481-0068-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS,
OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE AND BEARING
INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN TO 1500
FEET ALT OR 15 NM FROM LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR
DETERMINING RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE
REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER TACAN UNITS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR
DETERMINING RANGE AND BEARING EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND
STARTING 15 NM FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS.) LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ANTENNA FUNCTOIN WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
TACAN FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SHEMATIC VS 70,740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION i.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:



























_D_DANCY SC_ENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: _WER _SE_GE
P_T _BER: MC481-0072-23300-I
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CA_S_: CONT_INATION, PIECE-P_T.....................FAILU_ , T_P__, LOSS OF
INPUT, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_ z _ _:_ _t; _ -_
DUAL _DUNDANT _D_ ALTIMETER _ITS, IN TWO SINGLE STRINGS,
OPE_TE SI_LTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE ALTITUDE DURING THE DEORBIT
P_SE FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDO_. LOSS OF _LL CAPABILITY FOR i!_
LOSS OF VEHIC_ AND C_W. (LI_ RED_DANCY EXISTS VIA ANOTHER
_D_ ALTI_TER STRING, AND _LI_ _D_DANCY FOR DETE_INING
ALTI_DE EXITST VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND THE B_OMETRIC .........
ALTI_TER). _SS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFO_ ANTENNA FUNCTION
WOULD _SULT IN LOSS OF_ CAPABILITy. SECOND FAILU_ COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF RA FUNCTION.
_FE_NCES: SYSTEM SHE_TIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, O_S NSTS










































MSBLS RF WAVEGUIDE ASSEMBLY
RF LEAKAGE, SIGNAL LOSS
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAI DS
3 ) MSBLS























CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS, OPERATE
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE, AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION
ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER
MSBLS SETS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM,
SLANT RANGE AND BEARING DOWN TO 1500 FT VIA THE TACAN, AND
ALTITUDE VIA THE RADAR AND BAROMETER ALTIMETERS FROM 5000 FT
TO TOUCHDOWN.) THE GPC SOP WILL BLOCK USE OF DATA FROM AN MSBLS
SET WHEN RANGE DATA IS LOST. RF LEAKAGE COULD REDUCE EFFECTIVE
RANGE OF ONE MSBLS UNIT.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE iiI, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MSBLS RF WAVEGUIDE ASSEMBLY
BROKEN WAVEGUIDE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: CABIN PRESSURE BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: ME413-0038-0034
CAUSES: c6NT_INATION'_I_ART FAILURE,_EM__RE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONA__D_ ................. ii.......
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRiNGs, 0PERATE
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE, AZIMUTH AN_DELEVATIQN ....
ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH LANDING. LOSS OF ADD_C_AP_A_BIL_ITy_
FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER
MSBLS SETS, _D UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM,
SLANT RANGE AND BEARING DOWN TO 1500 FT VIA THE TACAN, AND ...... _
ALTITUDE VIA THE RADAR AND BAROMETER ALTIMETERS FROM 5000 FT
TO TOUCHDOWN.) THE GPC SOP WILL BLOCK USE OF DATA FROM AN MSBLS
SET WHEN RANGE DATAI!S LOST. RF LEDGE COULD _DUCE _FFECTIVE
RANGE OF ONE MSBLS UNIT, BUT SECOND BREAK COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
PRESSURE IN CABIN ENDANGERING LIFE OR CREW.
REFERENCES: sYSTEM_SH_TIc VS 70_74_i_9, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.














































FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/5





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS, OPERATE
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE, AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION
ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER
MSBLS SETS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM,
SLANT RANGE AND BEARING DOWN TO 1500 FT VIA THE TACAN, AND
ALTITUDE VIA THE RADAR AND BAROMETER ALTIMETERS FROM 5000 FT
TO TOUCHDOWN.) THE GPC SOP WILL BLOCK USE OF DATA FROM AN MSBLS
SET WHEN RANGE DATA IS LOST. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
ANTENNA FUNCTION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MSBLS FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-39
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















SHORTED CONTACTS, JAMS ON
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) RADAR ALTIMETER







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL REDUNDANT RADAR ALTIMETER UNITS, IN TWO SINGLE STRINGS,_ :_
INCLUDING DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE
ALTITUDE DURING THE DEORBIT PHASE FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.
LOSS OFALL CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING ALTITUDE VIA LIKE OR
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW' _ (LIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA ANOTHER RADAR ALTIMETER UNIT, AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY F_R DETERMINING ALTITUDE EXISTS VIA THEGN&C SUBSYSTEM
AND THE BAROMETRIC ALTIMETER.) SHORTED CONTACTS AND JAMMING
ON WOULD ALLOW NORMAL OPERATION. CIRCUIT BREAKER COULD PROVIDE
FOR MANUAL ON/OFF CONTROL.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SHEMATIC VS70-740159, SSSH 9.3, OMRS NSTS







































LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT
RANGE, AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH
LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA
LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER MSBLS STRINGS, AND UNLIKE VIA THE
GN&C SUBSYSTEM, SLANT RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE TACAN DOWN TO
1500 FT AND ALTITUDE VIA THE RADAR AND BAROMETRIC ALTIMETERS
FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.) SHORTED OCNTACTS WOULD APPEAR AS A
CLOSED SWITCH ALLOWING NORMAL OPERATION. CIRCUIT BREAKER CAN BE
USED FOR MANUAL ON/OFF CONTROL.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RADAR ALTIMETER, RESISTOR R1
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
1 UNIT BAY i, 1 UNIT IN BAY 2A4RI
RWR8051211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: _ _ __+_ _ _-_ ........ _ ..... =
DUAL REDUNDANT RADAR ALTIMETER UNITS, IN TWO SINGLE STRINGS,
OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE ALTITUDE DURING THE DEORBIT
PHASE _M _SQ00 __T_Q_NTQU_Q_. L_SS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR
DET--ERM-I-NING _ALTI_DE=+:ViA LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA ANOTHER
RADAR ALTIMETER UNIT, AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY FOR DETERMINING
ALTITUDE EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND THE BAROMETRIC
ALTIMETER. ) RESISTOR PROVIDES SCAN CURRENT LIMITING. OPEN WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF SCAN WITH NO EFFECT ON SYSTEM OEPRATION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SHEMATIC VS70-740159, SSSH 9.3, OMRS NSTS











































PAN AND TILT UNIT LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS OPEN













PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "A" POINTING CAPABILITY. LIMIT
SWITCH NORMALLY OPEN, BUT MAY DAMAGE MOTOR WHEN MECHANICAL STOP
IS ENCOUNTERED, SHOULD BE EASILY DETECTED WITHOUT INCIDENT.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















PAN AND TILT UNIT LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS SHORTED













PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD PAYLOAD BAY PORT POSITION (TVC A)
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHO_,,_RATION, PIEdE_PART FAILi_IRE _ _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTVSYSPROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO_ ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF_ALL_'__OBTAIN ccTv_IONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUN_COULD IN THE WORSTCASE PRE_T RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR
FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "A" POINTING
CAPABILITY. SHORTED SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF TARGET TRACK
CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
i6.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









































PAN AND TILT UNIT LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS OPEN













PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "A" POINTING CAPABILITY. LIMIT
SWITCH NORMALLY OPEN, BUT MAY DAMAGE MOTOR WHEN MECHANICAL STOP
IS ENCOUNTERED, SHOULD BE EASILY DETECTED WITHOUT INCIDENT.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-45
iDATE: 3/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 28380 ABORT:
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT LIMIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
















PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C .... ABORT HDw/_c
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTVSYSPROVI_DE__E$SENTIA_Lr_ISUAL FEEgB_T9 DQ_NT ONORBIT

















STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND _[ILD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMs
STOW AND P/L BA-Y DOOR c_S_ RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP AND RMS WRIST TVC TO VIEW RMS ACTIVITY). PTU PROVIDES
RMS ELBOW TVC POINTING CAPABILITY. LIMIT SWITCH SHORT RESULTS IN
LOSS OF TARGET TRACK CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
16.1, .12,
FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
.13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET


















MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS OPEN













MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) OPEN IRIS LIMIT SWITCH WOULD ALLOW FOR NORMAL
OPERATION. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .i2, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171

















MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS SHORTED













MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CABIN
PART NUMBER: 2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND K'J BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) LIMIT SWITCH SHORT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV CAMERA
IRIS, CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV CABIN FLT DECK
COVERAGE. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH






































MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS OPEN













MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, _ INSPECT/MONITOR _P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) OPEN IRIS LIMIT SWITCH WOULD ALLOW FOR NORMAL
OPERATION. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/16/88








ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED













MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 2294820
CAUS_ _ __ATIONW TEMPERA_/ LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _ i<i _
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, S_UPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/EEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAPTO oBTAIN ccTv-FuNCTIoNS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) _RI_S LIMIT SWITCH SHORT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV C_RA
IRIS, CQNTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SC_TIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171


































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 3/16/88








ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLI_-REDUND CREW WIN_W VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) OPEN IRIS LIMIT SWITCH WOULD ALLOW FOR NORMAL
OPERATION. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS SHORTED













MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC
PART NUMBER: 2294820
CAUSES: cONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ;_
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEPOPS_/ INSPEdT2MONIT0_P/£_BAY_bO6R *_TC_S'_ ORBS-EXTERIOR,
RMS_D AgTACHED P/L. LOS_O_FA_AP_:TOOBTA_C_ _CT_0NS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP AND ELBOW TVC FOR VIEWING RMS ACTIVITY.) IRIS LIMIT
swITCH-- SHORT WOU_D _ CAUSal _I_I_O_: _ __ _RIS IC0_TRCt _ULTING
IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
=REFERENCES[=,=FLT==RULES , SHUTT_FLTOPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH

















































ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) OPEN IRIS LIMIT SWITCH WOULD ALLOW FOR NORMAL
OPERATION. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED














MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC
PART NUMBER: 2294820
_ - _ _!i_ _ _ _ -- _ _ _ _ ....... _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OFINPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN REN__DEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO 0_AIN _CC_ FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOORC_LOSUR_ RESULTING _N LOSS OF VEHICLE _D _
CREW_ ......(UN_LI_-RE_ C_W_DO=WVIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP AND WRIST TVC FOR VIEWING RMS ACTIVITY.) IRIS LIMIT
SWITCH SHORT WOULD CAUSE LOSS 0FTV CAMEP.A IRiS CONTROL RESULTING
IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH




































3/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC





WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
FAILS OPEN













WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,_LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PR0Y!DES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK T_DgCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INsPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE _DUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOS_ RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. _ (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP). OPEN LIMIT-SWITCH WOULD-NOT BE BASIS FOR LOSS OF _
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-55
=
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




3/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC





WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
FAILS SHORTED













WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP). IROS FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT SWITCH SHORT WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF EITHER IRIS. FOCUS OR ZOOM CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171























3/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC





WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
FAILS OPEN













WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) OPEN LIMIT SWITCH WOULD NOT BE BAISS FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/16/88








WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
FAILS SHORTED













WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CABIN
PART NUMBER: 2307088
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DQCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, sUPPOR_ MISSION E_OPS,_IASSIS_ IN _DEZ_iN_-_'I_
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RM S





















CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) SHORTED CABIN LIMIT SWITCH WOULD NOT BE BASIS FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE FLTOPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171














3/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC





WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
FAILS OPEN













WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) OPEN LIMIT SWITCH WOULD NOT BE BAISS FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-59
_m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




3/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC





WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
FAILS SHORTED













WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
oNORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RMS ELBOW TVC
PART NUMBER: 2307088
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSI()-N EX--I_()PS_,_%ssoIST_IN RENDEZ AND _
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, 6RB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW _ND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN Loss OF VEHICLE _AND_
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND _ B_D RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP AND WRIST TVC FOR VIEWING RMS ACTIVITY.) IRIS LIMIT
SWITCH SHORT _ CAUSE LOSS OF TV CAMERA IRIS coN_FROL _SULTING
IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171



























3/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC





WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
FALS OPEN













WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) OPEN LIMIT SWITCH WOULD NOT BE BASIS FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171








3/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC





WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
FAILS SHORTED













WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RMS WRIST TVC
PART NUMBER: 2307088
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART_FAILURE .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ ANg_ _ i_>_
STA/KEEP OPS, iNSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOS_ RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
CQASFOR CREW VISUAL INS_PECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) SHORTED LIMIT SWITCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC IRIS,
FOCUS, OR ZOOM CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV
COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171











































COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS OPEN













COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) OPEN LIMIT SWITCH ALLOWS FOR NORMAL OPERATION. NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-63
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COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAI_ SHORTED













COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CABIN TVC
PART NUMBER: 2294821
CAUSES: ....CONTAMINATION, TEMPE__, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CC_ SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOC_ENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RE_NDEZ AND
STA/_EP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
MS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF _L--CA9 TO O_T_C___S
VIA LIE AND UNLI_ REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE P_VENT MS
STOW _D P/L BAY DOOR CLOS_E _SULTING IN LOSS OF VEHIC_ _D
C_W. (UNLI_-_DUND C_ WINDOW VIEWING, MS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR C_W VISUAL INSPECTION AND _ BAND RADAR FOR _NDEZ AND
STA/_EP.) SHORTED IRIS LIMIT SWITCH WO_D CAUSE LOSS OF
C_ IRIS CONTROL RESULTING IN _SS OF EFFECTI_ CC_ CO_RAGE
OF CABIN. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT Ru_S, S_TTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH








































COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS OPEN













COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 . AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) OPEN IRIS LIMIT SWITCH ALLOWS FOR NORMAL OPERATION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
w
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ITEM: __ COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED













COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION: P/L BAY
PART NUMBER: 2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _...................._
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, AS_SIST IN:.R_D_Z AND .......
STA/KE_EP OPS, INS_PECT/MONITOR P/_BAY DQOR LATCHES, _ ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA AND UNLI REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAYDOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KIJ BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP.) SHORTED IRIS LIMIT SWITCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV
CAMERA IRIS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE
AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171



















































COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS OPEN













COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC
2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP 0PS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP AND ELBOW TVC FOR VIEWING RMS ACTIVITY.) OPEN IRIS
LIMIT SWITCH ALLOWS FOR NORMAL OPERATION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
m
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COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS SHORTED













COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC
PART NUMBER: 2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ -_
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP AND ELBOW TVC FOR VIEWING RMS ACTIVITY.) SHQRTED IRIS
LIMIT SWITCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV CAMERA IRIS CONTROL RESULTING
IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH










































COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS OPEN



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC
2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, _ AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS JETTISON, EVA AND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP AND ELBOW TVC FOR VIEWING RMS ACTIVITY.) OPEN IRIS
LIMIT SWITCH ALLOWS FOR NORMAL OPERATION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, ,12, .13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 03/18/88 E-69
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DATE: 3/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
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ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: _-Ai_SHORTED













COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL : 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC
2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .... _....._
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/LBAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, ANbAT--TACHEb P/L. _ LOSS_OFALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV FUNCTIONS
VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE PREVENT RMS
STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW ViEWING, i_MSJETTISON, EVA_ND
COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP AND WRIST TVC FOR VIEWING RMS ACTIVITY.) SHORTED IRIS
LIMIT SWITCH WQ_LD c-A-USE _Q_ TV C__IRIS CONTROL _ESULTING
LOss OF EFFECTIVECCZV COVERAGEAND POSSIBLELOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH





























NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment




1 Because of the contract modification requiring earlier
submittal of the assessment report, there was no time
to attempt to resolve the issue with the subsystem
manager.





NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEETCRDS_REFERENCE/ RECOMMENDATIONS _ :
'. IDENTIFIERS I: NASA II IOA RECOMMENDATIONS_*
I ........ . ......... ._ i I - I
,...................... ,J.................,_.........--_.-......-.........................',
"r
: NASA I IDA I:CRIT ',SCREENS II ,.RI_ I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE ',
FMEANUMBER '.ASSESSMENTNUMBERIfHWIF I A B C I:HH/F : A B C I (SEELEGENDCODE) I I

















I CDMTRK-I0502 II /
I COHTRK-I065 II 3/2R
I COHTRK-1524 II 3/IR
I COMTRK-1596 I: 3/2R
= COMTRK-30t_ II 3/2R
= COMTRK-350t II /
CDMTRK-4004 II I
CDHTRK-40O8 II 1
I COMTRK-4033 II /
I COMTRK-4034 II I
COMThK-_037 II /
: COMTRK-4038 II I

































P NAP II I
F F P II I
P NAP II I















































P P P II 2
P P P 11 2
P P P It 2
P P P :i 2
P P P II 2
P P P It 2
P P P :I 2






















































IDENTIFIERS :_ NASA I_ IDARECOMMENDATIONSi I
.............................: .............................................
.................................. ii i
NASA + IDA tICRIT + SCREENS ttCRIT t SCREENS + OTHER i ISSUEI
FMEA NUMBER t ASSESSMENTNUMBER I]HWIF : A B C ]IHWIF t A B C I (SEELEBENDCODE) : I





























































































































































































I IDENTIFIERS IT NASA ,," IOA RECOMMENDATIONS* :
I I...........
I NASA IDA ITCRIT I SCREENS II CRIT t SCREENS
I FHEA NUMBER ASSESSMENTNUMBER IIHWIF I A B C ITHW/F I A B C
==== =============.... = IT IT ==== =....









































































































, OTHER I ISSUEi
ISEELEBENDCODE) I I

































































































IDENTIFIERS II NASA I_ IOA RECOMMENDATIONS*
I .......................................... I_.................. I_ ................................................ I
NASA I IOA 11CRIT I SCREENS IICRIT I SCREENS I OTHER _ ISSUE
I FMEA NUMBER ; ASSESSMENTNUMBER :I HWIF I A B C II HWIF _ A B C _ (SEELEGENDCODE) I I
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
I COMTRK-BI56 II / I 11 / I
i 11 I I
I 11 I
I 11 I
I II / ;
: II / I
I II t I
I II / I
I 11 / I
: II t I
11 / I
I 11 / I
I" 11 / ,I
CDMTRK-BI57 _I / I
COMTRK-BISB I_ /
COMTRK-BI59 _I t
COMTRK-BI60 II I l
COMTRK-BI61 II I
COMTRK-BI62 ;I I I
CDMTRK-BI63 ;I t l
COMTRK-8164 II I l
COMTRK-BI65 I_ / I
COMTRK-BI6_ II / I
COMTRK-BI67 I: / ;
CO_TRK-BI_B II I I
COMTRK-816? 11 /
COMTRK-BI70 I_ t
CDMTRK-BI71 ;I / ;
COMTRK-BI72 :_ / I
COMTRK-BI73 II / ;
COMTRK-BI7_ I: I l
CDMTRK-BI75 I; I I
COMTRK-BI7& II 1 -I
COMTRK-BI77 II /
COMTRK-BI7B _ / I
COMTRK-BI79 II / I
COMTRK-BI80 _I I
COMTRK-BIBI II /




COMTRK-BtB& ;_ / I
COMTRK-BIB7 I: / :
COMTRK-BtBB II / ;
C_MTRK-BIB9 ;l I I
COMTRK-BIgO II i I
COMTRK-Blgt _: / I
COMTRK-BI92 II /
COMTRK-BI93 :: t I
COMTRK-BI94 l_ / I
COMTRK-BI95 l_ I I
COMTRK-BI% l: I
COMTRK-B197 I_ /
COMTRK-SIgB II I I
COMTRK-BI99 ;; I l
COMTRK-B200 _1 / l
C_MTRK-B20! I_ i :
COMTRK-B202 II I I
COMTRK-B203 ;I / l
COMTRK-B204 II / l


































IDENTIFIERS II NASA I! ]OA RECOMMENDATIONS*
I ............. i! ................................................ I|................ ..... ..................... I..... i!
I NASA I IDA I!CR]T I SCREENS I! CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUEI
I FMEA NUMBER I ASSESSMENTHUMBER I!HW/F I A B C IIHWIF I A B C I (SEELEGENDCODE) I I
t = = '=======.......=====If.... I! I I .......
CDMTRK-8206 ,," i I I! /
COMTRK-8207 I! / I I! l
ED_TRK-B208 ",, I I I! /
CDMTRK-B20g ,," I I I! I
COMTRK-8210 ,," I I ,," I
COMTRK-B2]I I! I I I! /
COHTRK-8212 ,," / I I! I
COMTRK-B'213 ",, / I I! l
COMTRK-B214 ,," / I ,," /
CDMTRK-B215 ,," / I II /
CDMTRK-B216 ,,.... I I ,, /
COMTRK-B2_7 ",, / I I! /
CDMTRK-B21B ,," / I I! I
CDHTRK-B219 ,," / I I! /
C0_-8220 ,," / I ,," /
COHTRK-8221 ",, I I 11 /
CDMTRK-B222 ",, / I ,," /
CDMTRK-B223 I! / I It /
COMTRK-B224 ",, / I I! I
COMTRK-B22S ,," t I II t
COHTRK-B22&. " ",, / t ,, ,1
COMTRK-B227 " / I I! Iii .
CDMTRK-B22B ,,." I I ,," I
COHTRK-B229 ,," I I II I
CDMTRK-8230 ,," / I ,," /
COMTRK-B23I I! I I I! I
COMTRK-B232 ",, I I ,," /
COMTRK-B233 ",, I I I! I
COHTRK-B234 ,," / I 11 /
CDMTRK-B235 I! / I 11 /
COMTRK-B236 II / I ,," /
COMTRK-B237 ,," i I ,," I
COMTRK-B23B ,," ,/ I ,," /
. CDMTRK-@239 i! / _ _I
COMTRK-8240 ,,....I I ,, i
COHTRK-B241 ",, l I I! /
COMTRK-B242 ,," I i I! I
_OMTRK-B243 ,," I I 11 21IR
COMTRK-B244 ,," / I ,," 2/1R
CDMTRK-B2_5 II I I ,,"21IR
COHTRK-B2+6 ,," / I ,," 211R
CDMTRK-B247 ....,, I I ,_ 21LR
CDMTRK-B2¢8 I! I I ,," 2/IR
.... _ / I 2/tR
_MTRK-8=49 ....,, ,,
COHTRK-8250 I! / I ,," 2/IR
,.OMTRK-B_ul ,, I , ,, 312R
COMTRK-B2S2 ,," / I I! 312R
CONTRK-B253 ,," / I I! 312R
COHTRK-B254 I! I I ,," 3/2R
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3/3 l II 1 i I
313 I ]I I I ]
313 I II I I I
313 I I] I i I
313 I II / l I
313 I tl I I I
_,IIR I P P P II t I
311R I P P P I_ 1 I
311R _ P P P II i' I
211R I P P P II 1 I
311R I P P P I I I I
31IR I P P P I_ I I
211R ', P P P it 1 I
3/_ I Ii / I
313 I II I I
,.) ,.1
,./., I II / I
21tR ;,P P P ',I I I
212 I I: t l
2/!R i P P P I: / I
211R I P P P II t l
21LR I P P P T: I I
21IR',P P P II / l
2/2 : l] / I
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3/IR I _I / I P P P _ _.
2t2 t X I] 1 I l
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_/IR i ? P P ]] / :
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P NAP :: / I
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P NAP II I I
P NAP :I I I
P NAP II !
P NAP II I
P NAP tt 211R
P NAP It 2/IR
II 312R P NAP II / I
II 212 II / I
II 312R P NAP II 3/IR I
II 3ilR P N_ P II t I
II 2i2 ,," / I


















P NAP II I I
P NAP II I I
P H.AP II I I
P NAP II i I
P NAP II I I
P NAP II t I
P NAP II l I
P NAP II I
P HAP ;I i
P NAP II / I
P ,_IAP II i I
P HAP II I I
P NAP II i I
",, 312R P NAP ,," I I
II _I2R P NAP II I I
II 312R P NA P ,," i I
I_ 3t2R P NAP II l I
iI 3i2R F' _ P iI I
Ii 312R P H_ P iI ]
",,312R P HAP ,," /
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P NAP II ! I
P NAP II / I
P P P II 311R I P P P
P P P If 3/1RIP P P
P P P II 3/IR I P P P
P P P If 3/IRI P P P
P P P II 311R I P P P
P P P ,,":_ilRIP P P
P P P II 3/IR I P P P
P P P II 31LR IP P P
P P P ,," 311R IP P P
P P P II 311.R',P P P
P P P 11 311R II:'P P
P P P ,," 311RIP P P
P P P II 311R',P P P
P P P ,," 31IR I P P P
P P P II 311R I P P P
P P P II i I
P P P II / I
P P P ;I I 1
P P P II i I
P P P II / I
P P P II I I
P P P II I ]
P P P i I I
P P P I 1 I
P P P I I I
P P P 11 I I
P P ;I t I
P P II I I
P P P II I I
P P P 11 I I
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PPP ',t i
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P NAP II l I
P NAP II I I
P NAP II l I
P NAP II I I
P NAP II / I
P NAP II l I
P NAP II l I
P NAP II / I
P P P II I I
P P P 11 l I
P P P II / I
P P P II / I
P P P II I I
PPP ',I / I
P P P II / I
P P P II l i
II / I
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P NAP II I I
P NAP II I '
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P NAP II I
P NAP II l
P NAP II t
P NAP II /
P NAP II l
P NAP ',I t
P NAP II l
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P NAP II /
P NAP II l
P _IAP _1 I
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F F P I! /
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P NAP II l I
P NAP II l I
P NAP II t I
P NAP II ! I
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P F P II /
F F P II /
F F P II /
P I_AP }I t
P NAP II 1
P NAP II /
P NAP I! /
P NAP II f
P NAP II I
P NAP _I I
P NAP II i
P NAP ;I /
P NAP II t
F F P I! /
F F P II I
P ,_AP 11 /
P NAP II 1
P NAP II /
P NAP II 1
P NAP II /
P NAP II /
P NAP I: I
P NAP II /
P NAP II /
P NAP II /
P P_AP II /
P )lAP II I
P NAP I1 /
P NAP I! !
I! I
I! l
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II 3/2R I P P P
II 3i2R I P P P
",,312R I P P P
II 313 1
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I: 212 l
II 311R I P P P
11 3/2R I P NAP
_I 3/2R I P NAP
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i_ 312R i P NAP
_I 3/2R IP NAP
iI 312R ;'P NA P
_I 312R I P NAP
II 312R I P NAP
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_I 312R I P NAP
II 3i2R IP NAP
",,3/2R I F F P
312R I F F P
312R t P NAP
312R I P NAP
312R I P NAP
31JR _ P _A P
31IR I P NAP
_IIR I P _A P
311R I P NAP
311R I P NAP
212
SI2R I P P P
211R _ P P P
313 I
3IIR I P P P
313 i
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31[R : P P P
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P NAP II /
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P NAP II /
P NAP ,", /
P NAP ,," /
P NAP II /
P NAP " III
P NAP ',I /
P IAP II I
P NAP ',I 1
P NAP II /
tl /
P _IAP II I
P NAP II I
P NAP II /
P NAP II /
P NAP II I
P NAP II /
P NAP II t
P NAP II t
P NAP l: I
P NAP II t
P NAP II I
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It i I
II I I
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II 211R I P P P
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P P P II
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I NASA I IDA ,,"CRIT I SCREENS IICRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I +SSUE.1
I FMEA NUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBERIIHWIF I A B C II HWIF I A B C I (SEELEGENDCODE) 1 I
1,2,1 I COMTRK-BOO3E II 312R
1.2.10 : COMTRK-BOOIM ,,"3/3
I COMTRK-BOO2M ,,"3/3
I CDMTRK-BOO3M ,," 312R
1,2.11 I COMTRK-BOOIN It 313
COMTRK-BOO2N ,," 3/3
I CDMTRK-BOOSN ,,"3/2R
1.2,12 I CDMTRK-80010 ,," 3i3
COMTRK-BO020 llml313
) COMTRK-BO030 ]I 3/2R
1.2.13 I COMTRK-SOOtP ,," 3/3
I CDMTRK-BOO2P II 3/3
COMTRK-BOOSP ,,"312R
1,2,14 I COMTRK-BOOIQ tI 3/3
COHTRK-BOO2Q ,,"313
I CD_TRK-BOOSQ II 3/2R
1,2.15 I CDNTRK-BOOtR ,," 3/3
I CDHTRK-BOO2R II 3/3
t COMTRK-BOOSR II _/2R
1,2,16 I CDMTRK-BO01S II 313
; CO_TRK-6002S )I 3Y3
) COMTRK-8003S II 312R
1,2,17 ) COBTRK-BOOIT II 313
I CDMTRK-BOO2T I) 3/3
I COMTRK-BOOST II 312R
1,2,1B I CDMTRK-BOOIA _) _ _
I COMTRK-BOO2A II 2/2
I COMTRK-BOOIA II 2/2
1.2,!9 I COMTRK-8OOIU II 3/3
I CDMTRK-BOO2U II 3/3
I COMTRK-SOOSU II 312R
=/=1,2,2 I CDMTRK-BO01 II n n
I COMTRK-8002 II _,n
1.2,20 I CDMTRK-BOOIV II 313
I COMTRK-BOO2V II 3/3
I COMTRK-BOOSV tl 3/2R
_]=1,2,21 i COMTRK-BOOIB II _
I COMTRK-BOO2B II 2/2
l CDMTRK_BOOSB II 2/2
1.2.22 I COMTRK-BOOIC II 212
) CDMTRK-8002C " 212
I CDMTRK-BO0_C It n
i CO_TRK-SOO2D II 212
) COMTRK-9OOSD )) _._
1.2.3 ICOMTRK-BOOIF II 313
I COMTRK-BOO2F II 313
ICONTRK-BOO3F II 312R
1.2.4 ) COMTRK-BOOIG _I 313
P P P II /
II /
II I
P P P II I
II /
II /
P P P II /
II I
II I
P P P II /
II I
II /
P P P II I
l
I
P P P /
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i
P P P /
/
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P P P !
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3.2.B.2 ',COMTRK-B049C :: 3/3
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